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Introspective Training
Apprehensively Defended
Reflections on Titchener’s Lab Manual
Abstract: To study conscious experience we must, to some extent, trust introspec-
tive reports; yet introspective reports often do not merit our trust. A century ago,
E.B. Titchener advocated extensive introspective training as a means of resolving
this difficulty. He describes many of his training techniques in his four-volume lab-
oratory manual of 1901–1905. This paper explores Titchener’s laboratory man-
ual with an eye to general questions about the prospects of introspective training
for contemporary consciousness studies, with a focus on the following examples:
introspective knowledge of the combination tones that arise when a musical inter-
val is played; the ‘flight of colours’ in the afterimage of a field of bright, broad-
spectrum light; and the possibility of non-obvious visual illusions. Introspective
training appears to have some merit, but also to involve significant hazards.
Introspection must play a central role in the study of the mind; yet introspective
reports, even of current conscious experience, are highly unreliable. I have found
that philosophers typically accept the first of these propositions and deny the sec-
ond, while psychologists typically accept the second and deny the first.1 Indeed,
there is some tension between the two claims: If introspection is unreliable, what
business does it have playing a central role in the study of the mind? Nonethe-
less, I expect many of the readers of this special issue find themselves drawn, as I
do, toward both of these claims. The study of consciousness demands that we
trust introspective reports — at least some of them, sometimes — yet introspec-
tive reports appear not to merit our trust. What is to be done?
As you will have guessed from the title, I recommend that we consider intro-
spective training as a potential response to this difficulty. Even if introspective
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[1] I myself have argued for the second in Schwitzgebel & Gordon (2000) and Schwitzgebel (2002a,b).
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reports collected from the general population are often undependable, perhaps
subjects can be trained reliably to generate trustworthy reports, with sufficient
discipline and practice. The prominent American psychologist Edward B.
Titchener emphasized this approach a century ago, and his work will serve as the
focus of this essay.
Although the principal aim of this essay is to suggest a resuscitation of the
practice of introspective training, introspective training is beset with substantial
difficulties and perils. Considerable space is devoted to the articulation of con-
cerns that promise no straightforward resolution and which might thus be taken
to count against the central thesis. On balance, I think, the promise of introspec-
tive training recommends its pursuit despite the concerns.
The terms consciousness and introspection are notoriously difficult to define;
I will use them throughout this essay as though we all knew what they meant.
Titchener was not at his best when he set about to characterize the nature of con-
sciousness (e.g., 1910/1915, pp. 15–19; 1929, ch. 3), so I do not think it would be
prudent to rely upon him here. Perhaps it helps to suggest that we read ‘con-
sciousness’ here as at least roughly equivalent to Block’s (1995b) ‘phenomenal
consciousness’. Introspection Titchener characterizes as the observation of con-
scious processes, or the attention to and noting of such processes (1912a; 1912b;
1910/1915, pp. 19–25). I myself am drawn to a similar view of introspection,
according to which it is a species of attention to conscious experience
(Schwitzgebel, in preparation), but I cannot present the details of such an
account here.2 I will also set aside the issue of the extent to which the introspec-
tive act itself affects the experience introspected. Titchener argues that for the
well-trained introspector, introspection becomes almost effortless and auto-
matic, distorting very little the experience observed (1910/1915, pp. 21–3;
1912a, pp. 442–44; cf. 1899b, pp. 27–9; 1908, pp. 176–80; 1912b, pp. 490–3;
Wundt, 1895, vol. II, part 2, pp. 174–5). Titchener is not entirely convincing on
this point, but this issue has not been sufficiently explored (though see Ericsson
and Simon 1984/1993).
I: Historical Background, and Titchener’s General Position on
Introspective Training
A rough history of psychology will help put Titchener in context and display his
relevance to contemporary consciousness studies (detailed histories include Bor-
ing, 1950 and Danziger, 1990). As is generally known, experimental psychology
as a distinct academic discipline arose in the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It did so partly through the labour of Wilhelm Wundt in founding a produc-
tive laboratory and training a generation of students and partly through the model
of Gustav Fechner’s and Hermann von Helmholtz’s work in quantifying and
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[2] This view conflicts sharply with that of ‘transparency theorists’ (e.g., Harman, 1990; Dretske, 1995;
Tye, 2000) who argue that we cannot attend to our conscious experience (for counterarguments see
Block, 1995a; Siewert, 2004). It is also a narrower sense of ‘introspection’ than is often used (e.g., by
Wilson in the first volume of this collection).
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experimentalizing sense experience. Early experimental psychologists were
generally committed to employing introspection as a scientific tool.3 By the early
twentieth century, psychologists had achieved considerable sophistication in
introspective methodology. Among the more permanent accomplishments of
early introspection were the construction of the colour solid or spindle, with its
characterization of colour experience in terms of hue, saturation, and lightness or
brightness, and the measurement of relations between stimulus quality or inten-
sity and sense experience for each of the various sensory modalities (including
measurement of the stimulus changes required to produce a ‘just noticeable dif-
ference’). Much of what we know about the structure of sensory experience
traces back to the careful reports of relatively few trained introspectors from this
period.
By the 1910s, however, behaviourism had declared war on introspective psy-
chology, portraying it as bogged down in irresolvable debates between differing
introspective ‘experts’ (which was partly true) and rebuking the passive intro-
spective taxonomizing of experience in favour of developing a socially usable
paradigm for the modification of behaviour. In the 1920s and 1930s, introspec-
tive studies were increasingly marginalized. The consequent amnesia for early
introspective methodology was compounded by the simultaneous rise, as the
chief competitor to behaviourism, of Gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychology,
though it gave an important role to introspection, regarded classical introspec-
tive training as harmful, leading to reports in which the whole sensory ‘Gestalt’,
which is primary in ordinary experience, is disregarded in favour of particular
sensory elements (a criticism which, like the behaviourists’, has some merit).
With behaviourism and subsequently cognitivist functionalism dominating
experimental psychology for the remainder of the century, little room existed for
serious academic interchange on introspective methods. Although it has now
become fashionable again to discuss consciousness, and a rise in the respectabil-
ity of introspection seems bound to follow, we have not yet recovered the meth-
odological insights of our pre-behaviourist predecessors.
Titchener trained with Wundt at the height of Wundt’s career and was the
leading practitioner of classical introspective technique in the United States. He
stands out as a potential source of insight into introspective method particularly
due to his Experimental Psychology (1901–1905), a ‘manual of laboratory prac-
tice’ detailing a course of introspective training for students — a manual that
runs approximately 1600 pages (with separate parts for student and instructor)
and describes both the pitfalls of introspective laboratory work and the condi-
tions of its success with an explicitness one rarely sees in textbooks or journal
articles.
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[3] William James, in the section on ‘The Methods of Investigation’ in his influential Principles of Psy-
chology writes that ‘introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and
always’ (1890/1981, p. 185, emphasis in original). This is too strongly put: Leading early psycholo-
gists like Francis Galton and Alfred Binet devoted considerable energy to (non-introspective) test
performance, and Wundt himself thought that introspective ‘inner perception’ illuminated only a lim-
ited range of psychological phenomena. Nonetheless, most of the major overview texts of the period,
like James’, treat introspection as the, or at least a, chief method of psychological investigation.
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Psychologists of Titchener’s era generally accepted, as a condition of sound
scientific method, that introspective reports come from subjects — or as
Titchener preferred to say, ‘observers’ — with some significant degree of intro-
spective training. In published research, it was standard to depend exclusively on
the introspective reports of observers with graduate training in psychology and
thus presumably at least several months, often several or many years, of inten-
sive experience with introspective methods. Wundt is reputed not to have admit-
ted data from observers who had performed fewer than 10,000 laboratory
introspections (Boring, 1953).
In his Primer of Psychology, Titchener compares the development of skill in
introspection with the development of skill in physical measurement and chemi-
cal analysis (1899b, p. 25). Just as a chemist would never rely on an untrained
assistant for any but the simplest measurements, so also the laboratory psycholo-
gist cannot rely on untrained introspectors for any but the crudest observations.
In fact, precise, ‘quantitative’ introspection is considerably more difficult, in
Titchener’s view, than quantitative work in chemistry (1901–1905, vol. II, part
2, pp. cliii–clvii).4 Consequently, ‘the average student, on entering the labora-
tory, is simply not competent’ to participate as an introspective observer in quan-
titative experiments (II.2.cliv; cf. I.2.389). Difficulties include maintaining
consistent attention, avoiding bias, knowing what to look for, and parsing the
complexity of experience as it flows rapidly past (1899b, pp. 24–5; cf. 1915,
pp. 20–2). For example, without introspective training, Titchener asserts, it is
difficult to compare the relative brightness of two different colours (I.1.13;
I.2.31); to discern a very low tone sensation from a sensation of atonal noise
(II.1.1; II.1.3); or to make the quantitative assessment that two sensations are
each an equal distance, in different directions, from a third (e.g., that one tone
sounds as high in pitch above a reference tone as another tone sounds below it)
(II.2.201–204; II.1.xxxii–xxxiv). Experienced introspectors are also more likely
than untrained introspectors to maintain a consistent standard of judgment and
accurately to report lapses of attention and interfering influences.5
Titchener turns on its head the standard argument against introspective train-
ing, that it introduces bias. Especially regarding our own minds, Titchener
believes, everyone is subject to bias and preconceptions. People do not generally
approach psychology neutral between theses, even when those theses are dry
psychophysical ones — and when people do start out relatively open-minded,
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[4] Further references to the laboratory manual will list the volume in Roman numerals, followed by the
part in Arabic and the page in either Arabic if it is from the body or Roman if it is from an introduction
(e.g., II.2.cliii–clvii). The second part of each volume is intended for the instructor’s use only. The
1971 reprint of Experimental Psychology omits the second part of the first volume, and each part of
the first volume is itself misleadingly divided into two ‘parts’.
[5] For more specific discussions and examples of the benefit of practice in focusing on stimuli, steady-
ing one’s sense organs, and controlling one’s attention, see I.2.30–1; I.2.121; II.2.cliv–clvi; II.2.307;
for the benefit of practice in attaining a consistent standard of judgment, see I.2.87; II.1.xxxiii;
II.1.1–2; II.1.25–6; II.2.307; regarding knowing what to abstract, attend to, or look for in a complex
sensation, see I.1.41–2; I.2.48; I.2.52; I.2.75; I.2.87; I.2.217; I.2.300; regarding the report of lapses of
attention and interfering influences, see I.2.167; I.2.220–2; I.2.341–5; II.2.402; and, in conjunction
with each other, II.1.104–6; II.2.2–3; II.2.260.
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after a few introspections they are apt to speculate and form hypotheses.
Titchener consequently rejects the ideal of an introspective account ‘furnished
by a naive, commonsense, non-scientific observer, who has not yet adopted the
special attitude of the psychologist’ and thus supposedly takes a ‘neutral stand-
point’ (1912b, p. 489). Such a neutral standpoint is unattainable. ‘We can hardly,
with the pressure of tradition and linguistic forms upon us, consider mental phe-
nomena in a really naive way, with a truly blank prescientific impartiality’
(ibid.).6 In Titchener’s view, the avoidance of bias requires not naiveté but exper-
tise. Introspective practice and an ‘objective’ frame of mind aid the observer in
setting aside expectations to report mental phenomena accurately
(I.2.xxv–xxvii; I.2.151; II.2.133–4; II.2.202). ‘The trained observer, psycholo-
gist or physicist or what not, can take the suggestion [i.e., the hypothesis toward
which he might be biased] for what it’s worth; he does not allow it to affect his
observation. But the beginner is exceedingly liable to be led by interest into par-
tiality’ (1899a, p. 45; cf. Müller, 1904).
Probably no part of classic introspective methodology was more thoroughly
and permanently overthrown than the emphasis on extensive introspective train-
ing. (Some of the reasons for the overthrow were briefly mentioned above; it is
probably also worth mentioning that introspective training is quite tedious.)
Even among psychologists interested in introspection today, the idea that a sub-
ject would have to be trained in introspection for more than a few minutes —
much less hundreds or thousands of hours over the course of months or years —
remains alien (but see Varela, 1996; Nahmias, 2002; and remarks in several
essays in the first volume of this collection).7 If accurate introspection is diffi-
cult, however, it is plausible to suppose that training could bring substantial ben-
efits. Titchener was surely too optimistic if he felt that the well-trained observer
could completely insulate his introspective judgments from the influence of the-
ory and preconception, but given that the naive subject may be similarly prone to
bias, it is not clear that innocence is generally preferable to sophistication.
At one point, Titchener suggests that introspective controversies affected by
bias may profit from the flourishing of a diversity of perspectives. With respect
to the raging debate in his time over Weber’s Law, which holds that the intensity
of a sensation is a logarithmic function of the intensity of the stimulus producing
it, Titchener writes:
We want a large number of O’s [observers], we want O’s of all types and degrees of
training, we want tests of the method by men who are prejudiced or prepossessed
both for and against, we want a volume of introspective reports, we want the analy-
sis and critical judgment of those who see the method from within, in the light of
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[6] However, E.G. Boring claims that later in his career Titchener put ‘considerable faith’ in the method
of naive phenomenological report that he here criticizes, though he never published on the subject
(1950, p. 416; also 1927, p. 502; Evans, 1972). It is unclear how much Titchener actually shifted his
position or what his motivations for doing so would have been.
[7] Psychophysicists do sometimes train subjects perceptually — e.g., in ‘analytic listening’, which
involves distinguishing particular tones in a complex auditory stimulus — but such training is not
generally regarded as introspective or approached with Titchenerian introspective standards in mind.
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their own introspection, and of those who see it merely from without, as a piece of
applied logic (II.2.230–1).
In general philosophy of science, Longino (1990) and others have defended sim-
ilar approaches to dealing with bias. Such broad pluralism seems not to have
been characteristic of Titchener — he was generally inclined to privilege the
judgments of his own trained observers — but it would appear nonetheless to be
sound advice. Consciousness studies is presently well supplied with naive intro-
spective observers, but it is sorely lacking in trained observers who might bring a
different perspective.
The remainder of this essay will examine three particular exercises from
Titchener’s manual in order to display more clearly both the promise and chal-
lenges of introspective training.
II: Examples of Introspective Training: Combination Tones
If two tones of frequency U (for the upper tone) and L (for the lower tone) are
sounded together, it is sometimes possible simultaneously to hear a third, lower
(and generally quieter) tone, called a difference tone. The pitch of this difference
tone will resemble that of a tone of frequency U–L.8 For example, when two
flutes simultaneously play the notes F6 (fundamental frequency 1396.9 hertz)
and C6 (1046.5 hertz), listeners may also report hearing a note at about the pitch
of F4 (349.23 hertz) (Stickney & Englert, 1975). Similar effects may be produced
by combining sine waves in a sound editor program and listening to them
through headphones. The standard view, and Titchener’s, is that difference tones
so generated do not exist in the environment but rather are a consequence of
‘non-linearities’ in the human ear — i.e., that they result from the ear’s failure to
respond proportionately to all frequencies and energies of auditory input, distort-
ing the signal it transmits somewhat as an overdriven amplifier does (e.g.,
Plomp, 1976; Hall, 2002; Rossing et al., 2002).9 In addition to the (first) differ-
ence tone at U–L, a second difference tone (also called a cubic difference tone)
may sometimes be heard at 2L–U, and more rarely other tones, including a third
difference tone at 3L–U and disputably a summation tone at L + U. As a class,
these are known as combination tones.
Titchener introduces his introspectors-in-training to combination tones in the
seventh experiment series in the first volume of his laboratory manual
(I.1.39–46). He begins by directing their attention to a particularly salient differ-
ence tone produced by two Quincke’s tubes with fundamental frequencies of
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[8] For readers unfamiliar with these terms: Frequency is a physical measurement of the rate of vibration,
in this case of a sound wave, in hertz or cycles per second. Pitch is a subjective phenomenon pertain-
ing to how high or low a tone sounds on the musical scale. Generally speaking, higher frequency tones
sound higher in pitch (doubling the frequency increases the pitch by one octave), though as with most
psychophysical phenomena the relationship between stimulus and experience is complex when
examined in detail.
[9] I am not entirely convinced that there isn’t a sense in which difference tones exist in the environment
(see also Hall, 1981), but the philosophical and acoustic issues are complex. Ultimately, I think no
major points in the text hang on this issue, as should become evident later in this section.
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approximately 1584 hertz and 1980 hertz. (Quincke’s tubes consist of a glass
whistle connected to a resonator, producing a relatively pure tone. Drawings
appear on I.1.40 and I.1.44.) Titchener remarks that the difference tone’s ‘mod-
erate loudness’ combined with its depth (two octaves below the lower of the pri-
mary tones) should make it ‘easily recognizable’ to the student (I.1.41). He
advises repeated production of this difference tone until the observer ‘is entirely
satisfied with his introspections’ (ibid.). Titchener next recommends the student
listen for the difference tone of two Quincke’s tubes of 1584 and 2376 hertz,
which he describes as particularly loud and one octave below the lower genera-
tor. After these two hopefully easy introspections are each rehearsed several
times, the student is instructed to proceed up and down the musical intervals,
then to practice hearing difference tones when one or both of the generating
tones is quiet and when the duration of the tones is short. Finally, the student is
instructed in similar procedures for the second and third difference tones and the
summation tone. Titchener expects students to have only limited success in hear-
ing the more difficult of these tones. Still, by the end of the experiment series —
presumably conducted within one or a few sessions over the course of a week or
less — the student should be able to discern combination tones that would previ-
ously have eluded her. She has, apparently, become something of an ‘introspec-
tive expert’ in this limited domain.
On my website, I have posted an adaptation of Titchener’s training procedure,
using sine wave tones generated by a sound editor (a link is on my homepage,
www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz). I recommend that the reader pause now to
attempt the procedure to obtain a more vivid sense of the nature of Titchenerian
introspective training.
Several features of Titchener’s training procedure bear comment. First, the
training does not proceed by mere repetition of a stimulus or presentation of
stimuli in random order. Rather, it begins with comparatively easy introspec-
tions and proceeds to more difficult ones only after the easier are mastered. Also,
since there is good theoretical reason to expect each difference tone to be heard at
a particular pitch — reasons having to do with acoustics and the ear and con-
firmed by accomplished introspectors — the students’ introspective reports can
be verified. Titchener suggests that several tones be produced and the students be
required to say which tone is closest in pitch to the difference tone they purport to
hear (I.2.70). Many (but not all) of Titchener’s exercises share these features of
scaled difficulty and corrective feedback. Indeed, so do many ordinary
non-introspective training procedures.
Let’s back up a bit, though, and ask: Are students in this experiment really
introspecting? In my experience, attempting to discern a combination tone feels
no different from attempting to discern a faint tone of the ordinary sort. It feels
just like listening for sounds in the external environment. One could presumably
develop substantial expertise in discerning combination tones without ever tak-
ing oneself to be introspectively reporting one’s own mental states.
One might hope to defend the view that the training is nonetheless introspec-
tive on the grounds that combination tones, being (in general opinion) an artefact
64 E. SCHWITZGEBEL
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
of the ear, do not exist in the world in the same way that ordinary tones do, and
thus that in attending to them one cannot be attending to the outside world. Since
it sounds odd to say that one is attending to one’s ear, it is easy to suppose that
one must be attending to some part of one’s experience, that is to say,
introspecting. However, this argument would prove too much. If every sensory
or perceptual feature that does not exist outside the observer is introspectively
discovered, then many illusions are discoverable only by introspection. Perhaps,
indeed, we should regard combination tones as similar to double images, colour
adaptation effects, or the floating black spots experienced by people with a cer-
tain type of eye damage — that is, as a kind of illusion, a product of our sensory
apparatus not straightforwardly reflecting how things stand in the world beyond.
If you hold your finger six inches before your eyes and focus on something in the
distance while continuing to attend to the finger, and you consequently notice a
double image, are you necessarily introspecting? I’m not certain. (By the way,
did the double image exist before you attended to it?) But surely you needn’t be
introspecting if, with yellow-adapted eyes, you mistakenly judge a white object
to be blue. The blue is, in some sense, only in your own mind — but you do not
introspect it. Introspective attention to one’s own mind is no more necessary for
the discovery of difference tones than it is for the discovery of other actual or
illusory features of the world.
To see how Titchener’s procedure qualifies as introspective training we must
take a different tack. Consider the naive introspector asked to describe her audi-
tory experience of an interval sounded by a musical instrument. If she has a mini-
mum of musical knowledge, she might be able to describe the interval as, for
example, a major third, considerably above the middle of the scale, and indicate
the instrument upon which it was played if it is a familiar one. But her experience
is vastly richer than those words suggest, influenced by harmonics, resonances,
echoes, deficiencies in her ear, and sundry other acoustic and aural phenomena,
including combination tones. Some of these facts are indicated indirectly by her
statement that it was a major third played upon, say, a piano; others are not.
Auditory experience is far too complex for ordinary people to parse. Thus, a new
student entering Titchener’s laboratory, asked to describe her auditory experi-
ence with care and in detail, would be baffled. To provide introspective reports
of any value, she needs concepts and a vocabulary, a sense of what to look for,
and practice in discerning these aspects of her experience as it occurs. Training
in the recognition of combination tones is thus introspective training not because
reporting such tones is necessarily an introspective act but because for the person
antecedently interested in introspectively attending to her own auditory experi-
ence, the training provides a way of identifying and labelling one aspect of it.
Trained musicians and psychophysicists, therefore, although they don’t gen-
erally conceive of themselves as ‘trained introspectors’ in the Titchenerian
sense, and although they have ordinarily not undergone any general course of
training and reflection on the methodology of introspection, possess some tools
for apprehending their conscious experience that others lack and that it’s part of
the Titchenerian introspective training procedure to provide. Indeed, to the
INTROSPECTIVE TRAINING APPREHENSIVELY DEFENDED 65
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) Im
pri
nt 
Ac
ad
em
ic 
20
18
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y 
-- 
no
t f
or
 re
pr
od
uc
tio
n
extent that their aim is to apprehend their own experience — as opposed to, say,
just improving (or mapping) their capacity to discriminate and label aspects of
the publicly shared audible world — their project does resemble Titchener’s, and
might profit from broader reflection on introspective methodology.
When an untrained observer at first cannot discern a combination tone, and
later in an acoustically identical situation can do so, a range of possible interpre-
tations suggest themselves. At one extreme, we might suppose that, while on the
second occasion she genuinely experiences the difference tone, on the first occa-
sion the difference tone was in all respects so thoroughly absent from her experi-
ence that we couldn’t even say that it contributed in some inarticulable way to its
richness. At the other extreme, we might hold that the auditory experience
remains in all respects completely identical from one occasion to the other, the
only difference consisting in a separable introspective process and judgment.
Neither of these extremes is especially inviting. Most philosophers and psychol-
ogists now take for granted that general knowledge can influence sensory experi-
ence, so that two people with the same peripheral sensory stimulation may
nonetheless have different sensory experiences. If so, it seems likely that knowl-
edge of combination tones and practice in discerning them will affect one’s audi-
tory experience, at least when one is deliberately listening for them. On the other
hand, if we grant that sensory experience is rich, beyond the capacity of most
observers fully to parse and articulate, and if we grant that combination tone sensa-
tions are not wholly created by the training procedure but can in some sense be dis-
covered in experience by the person adopting the introspective attitude, then
despite the ‘top down’ effect of general knowledge on sensory experience, a gap of
ignorance still divides the auditory experience from the introspective judgment
about it; and if Titchener is right, introspective training can help reduce this gap.
One might adopt the position that all mathematically simple combination
tones contribute to any auditory experience of a musical interval, despite in
many cases their never being reported even by the most sophisticated observers.
(Besides the combination tones described, combination tones of 2U–L, 3L–2U,
4L–3U, 2U–2L, and others are sometimes reported for various stimulus intensi-
ties and frequency ranges, as well as combination tones arising from the interac-
tion of harmonics of the fundamental tones.) However, supposing we reject that
view, in many cases particular combination tones will be genuinely and in all
respects unheard, and the introspective report of their absence will be accurate.
When, consequently, should we regard an introspective observer as sufficiently
attentive and well-trained that we may take at face value her claim not to hear a
difference tone? I see no simple resolution. Furthermore, difficulties of this sort
will necessarily emerge in any domain in which one admits the possibility of
erroneously reporting the absence of particular experiences — potentially creat-
ing a major stumbling block for introspective methods. Tellingly, Titchener him-
self slides, either deliberately or in confusion, between speaking of unreported
difference tones as absent and speaking of them as merely introspectively unde-
tected — most often choosing to say, ambiguously, that the observer does not
‘hear’ them (I.1.39–46; I.2.66–72, passim).
66 E. SCHWITZGEBEL
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III: Examples of Introspective Training: The ‘Flight of Colours’
At the end of the fourth experiment series, after his students have already con-
ducted fourteen other introspective experiments on afterimages, some rather
complex, and so have significant introspective training in this regard, Titchener
describes an experiment that begins with an observer sitting for five minutes in a
dark room with a curtained window. When his partner gives a signal, the
observer looks toward the window, the curtain is removed, and he stares fixedly
for twenty seconds at the vertical bar separating the window panes. He then
closes his eyes and reports his visual experience over the next few minutes. This
experiment is to be repeated until the observer reports similar visual experiences
on every trial (I.1.29–30).
What the observer sees is a sequence of shifting afterimages, known as the
‘flight of colours’. The reader can induce a flight of colours in herself by staring
for a few moments at a light bulb or by glancing quickly at the sun, then closing
her eyes, or she may wish to attempt a closer replication of the experiment
Titchener describes.
I quote at length from Titchener’s discussion of this experience in the instruc-
tor’s part of the first volume:
This experiment shows, in a striking way, the effects of practice. The report of a
wholly unpractised observer is a mere chaos. With attention, the uniformity of the
phenomenon soon becomes apparent; and presently the observers who at first gave
radically different accounts of the after-image will reach agreement upon all essen-
tial points.
With an unclouded sky, or a sky thinly covered with clouds and presenting an even
white surface, the flight of colours is as follows:
(a) A momentary positive and same-coloured image.
(b) Interval of 5 or 6 sec.
(c) Positive image, fluctuating in colour; sometimes with patches of red and green.
After 1 or 2 sec., the image settles down to a sky blue, the vertical bar remaining
dark.
(d) The blue passes, with or without interruption, into a green. The green is at first
very vivid; it disappears and reappears five or six times, growing gradually paler; at
last it is almost whitish. — These initial changes show a good deal of individual
variation. Some O’s [observers] now see
(e) A yellow image. This (or the whitish green preceding) is regularly followed by
(f) A deep red image. The black bar becomes luminous and slightly greenish, the
light appearing first as a crack in its length. This is the stage of transition from the
positive to the negative image. The red undergoes several fluctuations. Then
follows
(g) A deep blue image, with yellowish bright bar, more lasting than any of the pre-
ceding phases. The blue darkens, and the image gradually disappears, with or with-
out passing into
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(h) A dark green image. . . . Note the periodicity of stages c to h:
____ ____
| | |
B–G–Y–R–B–G10 (I.2.48).
|____|____|
It is by no means clear whether Titchener is right that practised observers
eventually settle on similar descriptions of the flight of colours. Titchener cites
Helmholtz (1860/1962) and Washburn (1899), who report roughly similar
sequences of colours. However, Helmholtz’s description is a rather bare state-
ment that the afterimage colours produced by intense white light proceed
white–blue–green–red–blue, while Washburn is Titchener’s student and so not
really an independent source. One might wonder whether Titchener’s explicit
statement that observers are to settle on a single sequence influenced his find-
ings. It is also unclear what influences, including theories discussed in the labo-
ratory, might incline observers to report one sequence rather than another.
By far the most detailed treatment of the flight of colours, complete with col-
our plates depicting the afterimages, is Homuth (1913). Homuth emphasizes the
importance of training to even a greater degree than does Titchener, indicating
the necessity of several months of intensive practice in observing afterimages.
Homuth divides his images (which do not include a vertical bar) into four parts,
the centre, border, outer frame, and extreme periphery, which undergo different
colour shifts. In his primary condition with bright white light, Homuth reports
the centre of the afterimage to be mainly blue alternating with reddish-violet,
magenta, or pinkish-violet, although the sequence concludes with a brown-
ish-yellow. The resemblance to Titchener’s description is minimal at best.
William Berry (1922) offers a broad review of the literature on the flight of
colours, dating back to Aristotle, and finds great variability of this sort among
researchers. His conclusion is that there is no consistent sequence in the flight of
colours, a point he supports with a study using his own observers (1927). (All
Berry’s (1927) observers were graduate students in psychology at Rochester, but
he doesn’t otherwise indicate their level of training.) On the other hand, Robert-
son and Fry (1937) point out that earlier observations were conducted under a
wide variety of conditions and thus might be expected to produce variable results
even if there is consistency in the flight of colours under any one condition. They
report consistency among their observers, with results fairly similar to
Titchener’s (as do Weve, 1925 and Barry and Bousfield, 1934). The very sparse
more recent research that I have been able to find does nothing to resolve the
issue. The matter was less settled than dropped.11
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[10] Blue and yellow are generally treated as opposing colors in visual perception, as are red and green.
[11] Wallace (1979) takes individual variability in the flight of colours for granted, while Young (1948)
and Feldman et al. (1974) assume the contrary. In his influential general review of the literature on
afterimages, Brown (1965) seems at one point to agree roughly with Titchener’s description of the
flight of colours (p. 480) but at another point, apparently inconsistently, to endorse Berry’s claim that
the flight of colours varies greatly from person to person (p. 490). A related issue is whether people
experience a similar or variable evolution of coloured afterimages following exposure to coloured
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When introspective training was banished from experimental psychology, so
also was the possibility of verifying or disproving Titchener’s claim. If intro-
spective training is re-instituted, we can put Titchener to the test. Titchener
seemed satisfied in this instance that observers with little general practice in
introspective reporting but some practice in reporting afterimages — the under-
graduates who had proceeded to the thirtieth page of his laboratory course
(I.1.29–30) — would eventually settle on a common description of the flight of
colours (presumably without feedback other than the explicit expectation that a
consistent flight of colours will be found). We can duplicate these conditions.
Suppose it turns out that unpractised observers report very different colour
sequences, while observers with both general experience reporting afterimages
and specific experience reporting the flight of colours converge on Titchener’s
B–G–Y–R–B–G sequence; and suppose further that the observers have no spe-
cial expectations about the sequence to be found. It would be possible that the
trained and untrained observers had both accurately described their experiences
— that somehow the training procedure had tamed the flight of colours. How-
ever, it is hard to see why this should be so. I would rather suspect, if the supposi-
tions hold, that the pandemonium of colours in the naive introspectors’ reports
reflected some sort of introspective incompetence on their part and that the flight
of colours is really as Titchener claims. We would then have learned something
interesting about the evolution of afterimages, something that might have a gen-
eral impact on our understanding of the visual system. And introspective training
would appear to be vindicated, at least in this one particular research domain.
Of course, there is no guarantee that things would turn out that way. Even the
best-trained introspective ‘experts’ on the flight of colours might continue to
give divergent reports. That would reflect rather badly on Titchener. Here, then,
is an opportunity to assess the merits of introspective training.
IV: Examples of Introspective Training: Non-obvious Visual Illusions
The more powerful illusions that one gen-
erally sees in textbooks and at colloquia
mask the introspective difficulties that
arise for weak or non-obvious illusions.
Confronted with Poggendorf’s illusion
(fig. 1, from I.1.165), most people feel
unambivalently comfortable in reporting
that, in some sense, the partly occluded
line which we may know to be straight
nonetheless ‘looks’ crooked.
If we accustom ourselves only to such easy cases — the ‘best’ illusions — we
are not apt to reflect that one might have to look hard to find an illusion, that one
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light. The evidence on this question is also divided (see, e.g., Homuth 1913; Weve 1925; Judd 1927;
Brown 1965; Stamper et al. 2000; Taya & Ohinata 2002). Other papers of interest include Fröhlich
(1921) and Shuey (1924).
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might be talented or inept in the introspection of illusions, and that the criteria of
illusori- ness and visual appearance are evasive.
Examine the figure below, from page I.1.154:
Titchener invites his students to
consider the following ques-
tions, which I ask the reader
also to consider:
How does the figure A strike
you at first sight? Fixate on
some point on be. What is the
appearance of the figure? Move
the eye slowly from b to e, and
back again. Does the figure
change its perspective? Move
the eye from b to c, and back
again. Is there any change? Is
there any uniformity of perspec-
tive, according as you move in
the directions bc, ba, ef, ed, or in
the opposite directions?
How does the figure B strike you at first sight? Fixate, first, a point upon bd, and
then a point upon ac, ad or cd. Is there any difference of perspective? Move the eye
slowly in the direction ba or bc; and then in the direction ab or cb. What happens in
the two cases? What secondary modifications of the appearance of the figure are
conditioned upon the shift of perspective? (I.1.154)
If you’re like me, following these directions is rather difficult — perhaps surpris-
ingly so. The difficulty lies partly in controlling one’s attention and the move-
ment of one’s eyes, resisting the temptation, for example, to glance at point c as
one is supposed to be moving one’s fixation slowly along ab. Since control of
attention is crucial to many introspective tasks, this point is worth noting. It
seems likely that attentional control varies considerably between people and that
it may be improved by both general training in introspection and specific training
with particular stimuli.
In the instructor’s manual, Titchener comments that in both figures, the cen-
tral line is generally seen as convex (i.e., closer to the observer) but that fixation
on any point on a line tends to bring that line forward (I.2.310–11).12 Although
my introspections of the experiences produced by fig. 2 were initially quite dis-
organized, I find them now mostly to conform to the pattern described. But I am
unsure whether I am now judging my experience of the figures more accurately
or whether acceptance of Titchener’s generalization has altered my experience.
Perhaps a bit of both.
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Figure 2.
[12] Many people have discussed ambiguous figures that appear to reverse perspective, the most famous
example being the Necker cube. The view that attention to a particular vertex tends to bring it forward
traces back to Necker himself (Necker, 1832). More recent research suggests that this tendency is not
perfect and a number of factors may be involved (Köhler & Wallach, 1944; Hochberg, 1950; Pritchard,
1958; Gregory, 1970; Girgus et al., 1977; Peterson & Hochberg, 1983; Long & Olszweski, 1999).
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The introspective difficulties
in fig. 2 do not stop there. To
gain a more acute sense of
them, it is helpful to consider
another figure (from I.1.160;
apologies for the imperfect
reproduction, especially of B):
Titchener has his students view
the objects in fig. 3 serially,
first with both eyes, then with
one eye at a time. He asks: ‘Is
there any illusion of extent [i.e.,
in the apparent length of the
lines]? Is there any other illusion? Look very carefully, in both cases, and do not
be satisfied with your first discovery’ (ibid.).
I find, in looking at these figures, as well as at those in fig. 2, that I feel consid-
erable uncertainty about how they presently look to me. Perhaps the reader will
feel the same way. In fig. 3A, does the vertical line look taller, shorter, or the
same length as the horizontal? With one eye closed, does the inner horizontal
limb (on the side of the nose) look longer, shorter, or the same length as the
outer? Of course, you can carelessly toss out a response, confident that no one
will prove you wrong (if such proof is even possible); but approaching these
questions conscientiously, I at least feel unsure of myself, hesitant, or perplexed.
If you share this feeling, I hope you’ll also share the sense that to find oneself
in such a difficulty is, in a way, peculiar. How could it be hard to reach a judg-
ment about how things appear to you? Although judgments about how things are
understandably carry some risk, judgments about how things look to you right
now are insulated in a particular way. Could you really go wrong in such a judg-
ment? And if you couldn’t go wrong, where does the difficulty lie?
Some readers will not feel any difficulty or have any sense that they could be
mistaken. Those readers for whom such a feeling arises out of general tempera-
ment or philosophical conviction will probably be out of sympathy with the
themes of this essay. Others, however, may have approached the task too casu-
ally, since, after all, no Titchener is standing over your shoulder forcing you to
write a detailed lab report. Consider, then, in more detail, fig. 3A. Look at it both
monocularly and binocularly. On first glance, in my experience, most viewers
report no illusion: The two lines look to be equal length and to bisect each other
perfectly at right angles. Nevertheless, figures of this sort are standardly pre-
sented as examples of the ‘horizontal–vertical’ illusion (e.g., Robinson, 1972,
p. 97; Coren & Girgus, 1978, p. 29).13 Experts in visual illusion appear to agree
that, in some sense, the vertical line in 3A does look longer to normal perceivers.
Perhaps something about the arrangement of this particular figure, with other
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[13] Classical sources for the horizontal–vertical illusion include Oppel (1854–1855) and Künnapas
(1955). Titchener claims that every object in fig. 3 shows this illusion, except the last, which he says
shows no illusion.
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figures and a frame nearby, compromises this illusion, but Titchener appears not
to think so (I.2.309, I.2.315). Bearing this in mind, return to the figure. Are you
still confident that the lines look the same length? With one eye closed, the hori-
zontal–vertical illusion purportedly is reduced or vanishes (I.2.315; also
Prinzmetal & Gettleman 1993). Titchener also claims that in monocular vision
the outer horizontal limb looks longer than the inner, and that in binocular vision
the upper vertical limb looks longer than the lower (ibid.).14 Some people, myself
included, do not find it obvious, on reflection, which of these illusions is present
or absent in their own experience.
Part of the difficulty here may be that it is not clear what it is for two lines to
‘look’ the same length. Clearly, it cannot be a matter of one’s overall judgment
about the length of the lines, since one can judge that two lines look different
lengths even when one knows them actually to be the same length. Is it a judg-
ment about what one’s assessment of the lines would be, if one were to depend
only on visual cues? I doubt visual cues operate separately from general knowl-
edge in the way that would seem to be presupposed by such an approach. And in
any case, the necessary judgment would be a difficult hypothetical one, requiring
us to ascertain the bases of and influences on our assessments — which we seem
to be rather poor at, generally speaking, for reasons famously reviewed in
Nisbett and Ross (1980). Do two lines look the same length if they extend equal
lengths across the ‘television screen of visual experience’? Many psychologists
and philosophers now think that there is no one locus of visual experience, where
everything comes together as on a screen, but rather a sequence of processes,
some in parallel, that may yield differing results.15 Even if there is something like
a television screen of visual experience, it is unclear whether how things look
should be judged by their projection upon it. Does a penny viewed at an angle
‘look’ elliptical or round? Does an oar half in water ‘look’ straight or bent (see
Ayer, 1940; Austin, 1962)? Presumably, there is an illusion in fig. 3A just in case
the lines look different lengths. But now I am puzzled as to what this means or
how we are to come to a dependable judgment about it.
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[14] I have been unable to find contemporary verification of these last two illusions (the first of which is
supposed also to be present in fig. 3E, the second in 3B). Titchener attributes to Kundt (1863) the view
that in monocular vision the outer limb appears longer than the inner. I’m not sure this is unambigu-
ously implied by Kundt; but Kundt does clearly claim that in bisecting a horizontal line, subjects will
show bias toward one side. I informally tested this claim by having subjects monocularly bisect, with
a pen stroke, lines of varying length, but I found no consistent trends. Titchener attributes the view
that the upper limb looks longer than the lower to Delboeuf (1865; see also Nicolas, 1995). I also
informally tested Delboeuf’s claim, parallel to Kundt’s, that subjects bisecting a vertical line will tend
to cut it too high. My subjects actually showed a weak tendency in the opposite direction.
[15] Such a perspective is engagingly explored in Dennett (1991). There is empirical evidence that differ-
ent visual subsystems are differently subject to illusion. One influential series of experiments studied
the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener Circles) Illusion, in which a circle surrounded by large circles is judged
verbally to be smaller than a circle of the same size surrounded by small circles. The experimenters
found that the part of the visual system that guides reaching, as measured by aperture size during
grasp, is largely unaffected by the illusion (Aglioti et al., 1995; Haffenden & Goodale, 1998; for
reviews and discussion of these and similar experiments, see, e.g., Clark, 2001; Glover, 2002). (I owe
this point to Tori McGeer.)
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To add a different sort of difficulty: Suppose that when you focus on the hori-
zontal line your sense is that the vertical line, as peripherally attended at that
moment, is the same length as the horizontal, but you recall the vertical line to
have looked longer when it was in focus. Or suppose that you don’t feel sure
whether the vertical line looks longer while you are attending to the horizontal
but feel a kind of compulsion to focus upon it to make the judgment. If visual
experience is a complicated flux, there may be no stable experience of the
lengths of the lines to underwrite a stable judgment about which looks longer.
One way to approach the question of whether there are illusions in fig. 3, even
for people who claim to see none, would be to construct a variety of figures like
fig. 3 but in which the relevant lines differ in length. The subject might then be
required to choose which lines are longer, and the researcher could check for a
tendency toward error in one direction or the other (as Künnapas, 1955 did for
figures like those in 3D and 3E). Alternatively, the subject might be given the
opportunity to adjust the lines until they are judged to be equal length (as
Gardner and Long, 1960a; 1960b did for the same types of figures). Such experi-
ments either replace judgments about how long the lines look with judgments
about how long the lines are, or blur the two judgments together. Perhaps this is
acceptable if the subjects are sufficiently naive, but a subject aware of the possi-
bility of illusion might treat the two questions rather differently. Furthermore,
the presentation of multiple figures in sequence, or the ability to control the
length of the lines, significantly alters the cognitive situation. Gardner and Long
find that as small a variation as whether the horizontal line is fixed and the verti-
cal adjustable or vice versa can have a pronounced effect on the magnitude of
error. It is therefore conceivable that someone may consistently err on such tests
and yet experience no corresponding illusions in fig. 3.
So, if someone reports no horizontal–vertical illusion in fig. 3A, should we
conclude that she genuinely does not experience such an illusion? Or might one
line look longer than the other despite the observer’s being an insufficiently
capable introspector to discover that fact about her visual experience? I can’t see
how we might easily go about deciding which is the case. To insist on the former
seems unrealistically to deny the possibility of inaccuracy in assessing the com-
plex stream of visual experience. To insist on the latter risks opening the door to
a world of illusions that no one reports and that never deceive us.
Perhaps we can imagine an observer who, when presented with a variety of
figures such as those in fig. 3, reports experiencing several small illusions in one
direction or other for each of the figures, though most observers report no such
illusions; and, further, that it turns out that both this observer and those who
report no illusions err, on tests like those described in the last paragraph but one,
in the directions predicted from the illusions reported by the first observer. Per-
haps it would be plausible to suggest in such a case that all the observers experi-
enced illusions in the original figures, that the lines actually looked to them, in
some relevant sense of ‘looked’, to be different lengths despite their contrary
report — and thus that we had on hand one introspector talented at reporting
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illusions and a mass of others misreporting their own visual experiences. But I
doubt things will turn out so neatly.
V: Conclusion
It is reasonable to suppose, with Titchener, that introspection is a skill, one that
not all people possess in equal degree. If so, then it is also natural to suppose that
it is a skill that may profit from cultivation beyond what can easily be provided to
a subject in fifteen minutes. Since the scientific study of conscious experience
depends on introspective report, trained observers ought in some cases to be
desirable. Close examination of cases from Titchener, however, reveals that the
process of training may raise a tangle of epistemic and methodological issues
that promise no easy resolution. Until we grapple with those issues and discover
adequate means of distinguishing trustworthy introspective reports from unde-
pendable ones, the basic data of consciousness studies will remain muddy and
inconsistent, and we will have no firm scientific footing.16
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